

for property, conveyed as indemnity); *Hall v. Creswell*, 12 G. & J. 51 (claims in equity); *Baltimore, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Barnes*, 6 H. & J. 60 (subscription to stock); *West v. Jarrett*, 3 H. & J. 486 (rents and profits); *Ratlie v. Sanders*, 2 H. & J. 327 (replevin); *Cawood v. Whetcroft*, 1 H. & J. 103 (assumpsit); *Thompson v. Dorsey*, 4 Md. Ch. 151 (charge for board); *White v. White*, 1 Md. Ch. 56 (bill for account for sales of stock). *Cf. Baltimore v. Ulman*, 79 Md. 482; *Donaldson v. Raborg*, 26 Md. 326; *Hoffman v. Smith*, 1 Md. 492; *Baltimore, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Barnes*, 6 H. & J. 60.

If a plaintiff mistakes his remedy, and pending the action limitations runs, he is barred. *Willard v. Wood*, 164 U. S. 523.

For a waiver of the statute of limitations, see *Cape Sable Co.'s Case*, 3 Bl. 672; *Welch v. Stewart*, 2 Bl. 41; *Strike's Case*, 1 Bl. 57.

For a case discussing the legislative power to pass a law which revives a debt which has become barred by limitations, see *Hagerstown v. Sehner*, 37 Md. 189.

Where fraud is relied on to remove the bar of the statute, resort must be had to equity. (This case was decided before the adoption of section 14). *Negro Franklin v. Waters*, 8 Gill, 331.

Article 53, section 26, construed in connection with this section—see notes thereto. *Safe Deposit Co. v. Marburg*, 110 Md. 413.

Cited but not construed in *Willard v. Wood*, 135 U. S. 309.

For the time within which the discharge of an insolvent may be attacked for fraud, see art. 47, sec. 21.

1904, art. 57, sec. 2. 1888, art. 57, sec. 2. 1860, art. 57, sec. 2. 1715, ch. 23, sec. 3. 1818, ch. 216. 1884, ch. 502. 1890, ch. 548. 1894, ch. 661.

2. If any person entitled to any of the actions mentioned in the preceding section shall be at the time such cause of action accrues within the age of one and twenty years or *non compos*, he or she shall be at liberty to bring the said action within the respective times so limited after the disability is removed, as other persons having no such disability might or should have done.

When the statute once begins to run, no subsequent disability will arrest it unless so provided by statute. *Maurice v. Worden*, 52 Md. 294; *Fink v. Zepp*, 76 Md. 185; *Lurman v. Hubner*, 75 Md. 272. See also, *Gump v. Sibley*, 79 Md. 169; *Dempsey v. McNabb*, 73 Md. 438; *Stewart v. Spedden*, 5 Md. 448; *Young v. Mackall*, 4 Md. 374; *Ruff v. Bull*, 7 H. & J. 16.

A party is protected by the disability that exists at the time his right of action first accrues, and if there are several disabilities at such time, the statute does not begin to run until the party has survived them all. The operation of the statute can not, however, be prevented by cumulative disabilities. *Dugan v. Gittings*, 3 Gill, 160.

The act of 1818, ch. 16, is constitutional. It repealed the saving clause as to persons "beyond the seas." Such persons had three years from the passage of the act in which to bring suit. (See section 7). *Frey v. Kirk*, 4 G. & J. 521. See also, *Garrison v. Hill*, 81 Md. 558; *Mason v. Union Mills Co.*, 81 Md. 450; *Pancoast v. Addison*, 1 H. & J. 352; *Brent v. Tasker*, 1 H. & McH. 89; *Coursey v. Wright*, 1 H. & McH. 394; *Bank of Alexander v. Dyer*, 14 Pet. 141.

The statutory period having expired after the disability was removed, limitations is a bar. *Hertle v. McDonald*, 2 Md. Ch. 133; *Boyd v. Harris*, 2 Md. Ch. 214.

This section applied as to infancy. *Chambers v. Woodberry Co.*, 106 Md. 497; *Welch v. State*, 5 H. & J. 369.

Cited but not construed in *Smith v. Williamson*, 1 H. & J. 150.

*Ibid.* sec. 3. 1888, art. 57, sec. 3. 1860, art. 57, sec. 3. 1715, ch. 23, sec. 6. 1729, ch. 24, secs. 21, 22. 1818, ch. 216. 1890, ch. 548. 1894, ch. 661. 1904, ch. 414.

3. No bill, testamentary, administration or other bond (except sheriffs and constables' bonds), judgment, recognizance, statute mer-